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RESEARCHING CIVIL JUSTICE:
PROBLEMS AND PITFALLS
DEBORAH R. HENSLER*
INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade there has been a burgeoning of empirical research on
civil justice issues. Concern about congestion and delay on civil court
calendars has rekindled analysts' interest in explaining civil case processing
time.' Claims that the country is awash in litigation have provided support for
continuing efforts to measure the number and types of lawsuits filed in state
and federal courts 2 and to analyze Americans' propensity to litigate.3
Increases in liability insurance premiums have spawned new interest in
describing trends in civil jury verdicts 4 and modeling litigation processes. 5
The spread of alternative dispute resolution procedures has produced a new
market for program evaluation research. 6
In addition to more research on civil justice questions, there is more
interest in using the results of such research. Along with heightened interest
has come controversy over the validity of results of different studies, how the
studies should be interpreted, and what their implications for policymaking
are.
Disputes over research methods and statistical inferences take on a new
dimension as they move out of the seminar room and into the policy arena.
Particularly in topical areas where data are fragmentary and the available
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1. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, ATTACKING LITIGATION COSTS AND DELAY: FINAL REPORT OF
THE ACTION COMMISSION TO REDUCE COURT COSTS AND DELAY (1984); '. CHURCH, A. CARLSON,J. LEE
& T. TAN, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAl. COURTS (1978); S. FLANDERS,
P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN, J. LEDERER, J. McDERMO-I" & D. NEUBAUER, CASE MANAGEMENT AND
COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (1977); L. SIPES, A. CARLSON, T. TAN, A.
AIKMAN & R. PAGE, MANAGING TO REDUCE DELAY (1980).
2. See, e.g., Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986); Roper, The
Propensity to Litigate in State Tial Courts, 1981-1984, 1984-1985, 11 JUST. Sys. J. 262 (1986).
3. See, e.g., Miller & Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversaty Culture, 15 LAw &
Soc'Y REV. 525 (1980-81).
4. See, e.g., M. PETERSON, CIVIL JURIES IN THE 1980s: TRENDS INJURY TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN
CALIFORNIA AND COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS (1987); Daniels & Martin.irvy Verdicts and the "Cisis C ivil
justice, II JUST. Sys. J. 321 (1986).
5. See, e.g., P. DANZON & L. LILLARD, THE RESOLUTION OF MEDICAl. MALPRACTICE CLAIMS:
RESEARCH RESULTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 7-13 (1982); Viscusi, The Determinants of the Disposition of
Product Liabilty Claims and Compensation for Bodily Injury. 15J. LECAL STUD. 321 (1986).
6. See, e.g., D. HENSLER, A. LIPSON & E. ROLPH, JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA: THE
FIRST YEAR (198 1);J. ADLER, D. HENSLER & C. NELSON, SIMPLEJUSTICE: How LIICANTS FARE IN THE
PITTSBURGH COURT ARBITRATION PROGRAM (1983).
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analytic tools are crude, there is considerable potential for both inconsistent
results and disagreements over interpretation. Sometimes it is difficult to
disentangle disagreements with analytic methodology from disagreements
with the policy recommendations that might be drawn from a given set of
results.
Researchers in the Institute for Civil Justice ("ICJ") at the Rand
Corporation have been involved in debates over the reliability and meaning of
research results on such varied topics as alternative dispute resolution,
asbestos litigation, and trends in civil jury verdicts. Some of the issues that
have been raised with regard to the research are specific to the topic under
study. Some issues, however, cut across topics and arise repeatedly. This
article discusses some of the problems that civil justice researchers face when
their results are used in public policy debate.
II
MATCHING DATA AND QUESTIONS
It is not uncommon for media and interest groups to draw inferences
regarding a policy question from data gathered to address altogether different
questions. Researchers' protests that "those data cannot answer that
question" often go unheeded. For example, in the recent debate over tort
liability, data on the amount of litigation in state and federal courts were often
cited as proof of Americans' "litigiousness," or propensity to sue. 7 Most
researchers would agree that measuring litigiousness requires relating the
number of claims or suits filed (or some other measure of litigation) to the
number of opportunities for litigation that arise.8 At best, however,
researchers tracking the amount of litigation nationwide have been able to
relate aggregate filings only to population. 9 By themselves, such data do not
show much about the propensity to sue.
The fact that filings on their own do not prove much about litigiousness
does not, however, mean that the filings are irrelevant for other issues. When
researchers who were trying to deal with the litigiousness issue seemed to
downplay the growth in filings, some judges expressed fears that the
suggestion that cases were not increasing in number would impair their ability
to obtain additional court resources. The distinction between the statement
that "these data are not the right data for your question" and the statement
that "these data are not right" is easily lost when dealing with the mass media.
In another dimension of the tort liability debate, statistics indicating
increases in civil jury awards for personal injury and contract cases were used
7. See, e.g., Church, Sorm, Your Policy Is Canceled, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 16, 20.
8. See, e.g., Vidmar & Schuller, Individual Differences and the Pursuit of Legal Rights: .A Preliminary
Inquiry, II LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 299, 302-03 (1987).
9. See, e.g., J. KAKALIK & N. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION 11
(1986); Roper, supra note 2, at 272-76.
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by some to demonstrate that juries were "out of control."' 0 Available jury
verdict data indicate that average awards have been increasing over time,
particularly for high stakes cases such as medical malpractice and product
liability. 1  But jury verdict increases could reflect changes in the
characteristics of cases reaching juries;1 2 changes in the balance of skills and
resources available to plaintiff and defense lawyers; or changes in how juries
feel about the responsibility of professionals, corporations, and others to
prevent injuries.' 3 None of these factors would indicate a lack of control on
the part of juries, although separately or together they might well produce
increases in awards that some would deem unacceptable for other reasons.
The debate over trends in jury verdicts was misdirected because analysts
concentrated on whether the data evidenced jury control or a lack thereof. As
in the case of the litigiousness controversy, the data were not appropriate for
making either assertion. Without further knowledge of how juries have
changed their behavior-information not readily obtained from analyses ofjury
verdict statistics-no one can really say whether juries are or are not out of
control.
III
SELECTING STATISTICAL INDICATORS
The debate over the meaning of changes in jury verdicts has been
complicated by a debate over statistical indicators. In summarizing the
distribution of awards and changes over time in that distribution, researchers
have reported either median or mean awards, or both. 14 Because jury awards in
the period for which data are available have been very skewed in the direction
of high awards, 15 one obtains very different pictures of the distribution of
awards, depending Upon which indicator one chooses. Some researchers have
10. See, e.g., Church, supra note 7, at 20, 23; Wermiel, Courting Disaster.- The Costs of Lawsuits,
Growing Ever Larger, Disrupt the Economy, Wall St. J., May 16, 1986, at 1, col. 6.
11. M. PETERSON, supra note 4, at 20-25.
12. Previous ICJ research on verdicts in Cook County, Illinois, and San Francisco, California,
from 1960 to 1979 indicates that juries in those jurisdictions at the end of the period were seeing
cases involving more serious injuries and larger medical expenses than in cases tried at the beginning
of the period. But the research also showed that juries were awarding more money at the end of the
period than at the beginning for cases with the same degree of severity, suggesting that something
other than a shift in the composition of the trial caseload was at work. A. CHIN & M. PETERSON, DEEP
POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTYJURY TRIALS (1985); M. PETERSON, supra note
4; M. SHANLEY & M. PETERSON, COMPARATIVE JUSTICE: CIVIL JURY VERDICTS IN SAN FRANCISCO AND
COOK COUNTIES, 1959-1980 (1983).
13. D. HENSLER, M. VAIANA, J. KAKALIK & M. PETERSON, TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION: THE
STORY BEHIND THE STATISTICS 21 (1987).
14. See, e.g., A. CHIN & M. PETERSON, supra note 12, at 27-29 (reporting medians and means); M.
PETERSON, supra note 4, at 20-26 (reporting medians, means and expected awards); M. SHANLEY & M .
PETERSON, supra note 12, at 26-30 (reporting medians and means); Daniels & Martin, supra note 4, at
336-37 (reporting 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles). The median award is the midpoint of the
distribution of awards to the plaintiffs. The mean award is the statistical average. If awards are
distributed symmetrically, the median and mean will be equivalent. If, however, the distribution
stretches out very far in one direction, the skewing will draw the mean away from the median.
15. M. SHANIEY & M. PETERSON, supra note 12, at 80; Daniels & Martin, supra note 4, at 327.
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argued that because of the skewed quality of the data, it is inappropriate to
calculate and to present mean awards.1 6 This author's own view is that each
of the indicators is relevant for answering a different set of questions, and that
selecting one over the other provides an incomplete view of the distribution
of jury verdicts.
For example, an individual plaintiff wanting to estimate the likely outcome
in her case might be interested in the recent median award for that type of
case in her jurisdiction, since she can expect that her award has a 50 percent
chance of falling below (or above) that award. To get a better picture of the
distribution, she might also want to know verdict values at the twenty-fifth and
seventy-fifth percentile (and perhaps at the ninetieth percentile as well).
On the other hand, repeat players in the litigation process, including
attorneys and insurers, might be more interested in mean awards, since they
reflect the probability of obtaining awards of different values. In fact, repeat
players should be most interested in the expected award, which is the
probability of obtaining a plaintiff verdict multiplied by the mean award in
cases won by the plaintiffs. From a business point of view, it is the expected
award that affects the bottom line, not the median.'
7
Some insurers and other business people have asserted that their concerns
about recent trends in jury verdicts center around the unpredictability of the
eventual award rather than its amount.' 8 If jury awards were becoming more
unpredictable over time, the variance of the distribution, a statistical measure
dealing with the spread of values around the mean, would be expected to
increase. Yet, few reports include the variance.
The point is not that a particular indicator is right or wrong, but rather
that it is important to select and report those indicators that are most relevant
to the issue at hand. In the case of civil jury verdicts, where different
measures appear to tell different stories, it is probably wiser to report multiple
indicators than to focus on a single measure.
IV
EVALUATING MAGNITUDES AND DIFFERENCES
Despite disagreements over choices of statistical indicators and analytical
approaches, researchers generally arrive at the same answer to research
questions when using the same data. One value is either bigger or smaller
16. Daniels & Martin, supra note 4, at 326-27.
17. The bottom line is, of course, not just affected by jury awards. The bulk of personal injury
and contract cases are settled. Although it is believed that jury awards drive settlement outcomes, we
do not yet know very much about the dynamics of this process. In addition, the jury verdict is not the
end of the disposition process for those cases that are tried. A substantial fraction ofjurv awards is
rejected by one party or the other; most of these cases result in a negotiated outcome, while some are
disposed of by appellate court judgment. See Broder, Characteristics of Million Dollar Awards: J]uy
Verdicts and Final Disbursements, 11 JUST. SYs. J. 349, 353-58 (1986); M. SHANLEY & M. PETERSON,
POSrrRIAL ADJUSTMENTS TO JURY AWARDS 5 (1987).
18. Harris, W ill Liability, Bankrupt Us?, INS. RE'., Sept. 1986, at 29, 30 (quoting Peter Lardner,
President, American Insurance Association); Knapp, IWhos to Blame? Instrers or Coirts?. STATE GoVT
NEWS, Mar./Apr. 1986, at 4, 6. See Church, supia note 7, at 17.
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than another, and the quantity of a variable is either going up over time or
not. Researchers are in less agreement, however, with regard to what the data
say about the policy question under debate.
The debate over tort liability provides numerous examples of how people
differ in their evaluations of the same numerical data. In a recentJustice System
journal issue devoted to the "litigation explosion" controversy, Roper,
focusing on court filings, and Daniels and Martin, looking at jury verdicts,
conclude that there is little evidence of either "explosion" or "crisis" in the
system. 19 However, in a review of ICJ research looking at similar types of data
(including those reported by Roper and Daniels and Martin), researchers
concluded that there is evidence of substantial change in filings and verdicts
in certain components of the caseload and that for some sorts of litigation,
"explosion" may be an appropriate term. 20 The difference of opinion among
researchers may reflect the different weight given to data for products
liability, malpractice, business torts, and mass toxic cases.
In a second example of the same phenomenon, the Government
Accounting Office ("GAO") recently issued a report on product liability
trends in the federal district courts which questioned the extent of the
explosion in litigation. The title of the report summarized their analyses
succinctly because they found that much of the growth in product liability
filings was attributable to a single type of litigation, asbestos worker injury
suits. 2 1 In a critique of the report included in its Appendix, the Justice
Department retorted:
The [Tort Policy] Working Group was well aware that a significant number of the
product liability cases filed in federal court since 1984 involved asbestos-containing
products. This plainly was not considered an aberration in the data. To the contrary,
it was perceived as merely the most pervasive example of a rapidly evolving variant of
traditional product liability jurisprudence-toxic tort litigation .... To ignore these
cases as somehow irrelevant to the growth trend in product liability litigation is to miss
the forest for the trees. 2
2
Perhaps more interesting, researchers' inability to agree on judgments of
magnitudes may be affected by choice of "anchor points. ' 23 Various
researchers have noted that product liability filings in the federal courts have
risen over the past decade. Using published United States Courts
Administrative Office statistics, and doing the same type of calculation, a five-
to eight-fold increase has been observed, depending on the base year used for
calculating change.2 4 Recently, T. Dungworth analyzed the raw data on which
the Administrative Office reports are based and performed the same
19. Roper, supra note 2, at 281; Daniels & Martin, supra note 4, at 347.
20. See D. HENSLER, M. VAIANA, J. KAKALIK & M. PETERSON, supra note 13, at 1i.
21. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY: EXTENT OF
LITIGATION EXPLOSION IN FEDERAL COURTS QUESTIONED (1988).
22. Id. at 51.
23. See D. KAHNEMAN, P. SLOVICK & A. TVERSKY, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS
AND BIASES 14 (1982).
24. WHITE HOUSE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, REPORT ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY (1986);
Galanter, supra note 2; D. HENSLER, M. VAIANA, J. KAKALIK & M. PETERSON, supra note 13.
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calculation using as the base the year when the federal court system was fully
converted to the use of a new product liability case-identifying system. 25 At a
Rand seminar, Dungworth reported "only" a three-fold increase, much
smaller than the White House Task Force calculation, and hence, he
suggested, not very consequential. Some audience members not familiar with
the White House report took issue with this interpretation; they thought a
three-fold increase over a decade was very consequential indeed. Clearly,
their expectations regarding change were quite different.
Similarly, the author has had personal conversations with demographer
colleagues at Rand who criticize the characterization of a 4 percent annual
growth rate in tort litigation as "modest"; in demographic research, 4 percent
per year would be considered a substantial rate of change. The point of all of
these examples, of course, is that "explosions" are in the eyes (or ears!) of the
beholder.
Similarly, the measure of success or failure of programs or processes
depends on the standard chosen. The reaction to another ICJ report dealing
with posttrial adjustments to jury awards 26 indicates how responses to the
same absolute number may differ, depending on the standard applied. The
study showed that in Cook County, Illinois, and in a number of northern
California jurisdictions, about 20 percent of jury verdicts were changed after
trial. Across all cases sampled, the reduction in amount paid was about 30
percent; among the minority of cases that were changed, the reduction was
close to 50 percent. The amount of reduction varied with award size and was
largest in cases over $1 million. 2 7
Some readers noted the report with pleasure because it supported the
hypothesis that very large awards are frequently reduced by large amounts,
making it clear that tales of runaway juries were much exaggerated. Others
found that the report supported the hypothesis that the bulk of the money
originally awarded survives review, indicating that jury awards remain
relevant. Anticipating this reaction, the authors noted that the results were a
classic case of the "is the glass half full or half empty?" phenomenon. 28
One can dismiss such differences in interpretation of data as merely
reflecting differences in social values and political positions. However,
inconsistencies between systematic empirical observations and perceptions of
participants in the litigation process may constitute another form of data.
When encountering individuals whose perceptions of trends in jury verdicts
are inconsistent with researchers' empirical analyses, rather than dismissing
these perceptions as politically inspired or simply wrong, researchers should
wonder whether these differences in perception suggest something about the
settlement process. Do attorneys' overestimates of the likelihood of very
25. T. DUNGWORTH, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND THE BUSINESS SECTOR: LITIGATION TRENDS IN
FEDERAL COURTS 22-23 (1988).
26. M. SHANLEY & M. PETERSON, supra note 12. See also Broder, supra note 17 (reporting similar
findings).
27. M. SHANLEY & M. PETERSON, supra note 12, at 47.
28. Id. at xii.
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large jury awards influence their approach to negotiating claims in personal
injury suits? When businessmen express concern about effects of the liability
system on their businesses in the face of studies that suggest that the dollar
effects are small in relation to revenues, does this indicate something about
the way businesses respond to legal rules-something that research data on
insurance premiums and litigation costs fail to capture? How different people
evaluate magnitudes may tell us something important about social processes
under study.
V
SPOTTING TRENDS
Just as interpretations of magnitudes vary from observer to observer,
identifications of "trends" are subject to debate. Intuitively, a trend is defined
as change toward or away from some initial point. The questions that arise
are (1) what is the appropriate starting point? and (2) how long a period does
one need to observe before one declares there is a trend?
Often, when researchers are not quite sure what they are looking for, they
simply start plotting the trend from the first year data become available.
However, as illustrated by the discussion of product liability "trends" above, 29
this may lead to incorrect inferences. Using a more careful approach, a
researcher might calculate trend measures, such as change indices, using
different starting points and report how results vary with the choice made. If
a particular point in time is seen as a watershed year by policymakers,
researchers might want to calculate trend measures for both the period prior
to that year and some period after.30
The technical problems associated with calculating trend indices are easy
to solve. Determining when it makes substantive sense to start looking for a
trend involves much more difficult problems. For example, after the spate of
tort reform activity last year, many individuals on both sides of the tort reform
debate were eager to see changes in the rate of claim filings, average jury
awards, and/or insurance premiums. However, changes in statutory law, even
when they are not challenged in the courts, take some time to work their way
through the social system. If the changes that were made do have significant
effects, these effects would not be expected to show up for some time. Since a
complete understanding of the process by which changes in the law affect
behavior remains elusive, researchers should begin tracking critical outcome
variables now and should continue to do so for some time into the future.3 1
To this author's knowledge, no one is engaged in this sort of data collection
or analysis with regard to tort reform.
29. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
30. Another approach is to calculate year-to-year changes and average over the period.
However, this approach may hide interesting discontinuities in the trend line.
31. For a discussion of approaches to assessing the impact of tort reforms, see S. CARROLL,
ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM (1987).
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A second element in the debate involves how long a period to track. Most
researchers would probably agree that two years do not constitute a trend, but
are three, five, even ten years enough? Again, no one right answer exists.
Rather, the nature of the trend to be examined will often determine the best
tracking period. If one is investigating whether significant shifts in social
behavior have taken place, one should probably monitor change over a fairly
long period of time since most such behavior changes gradually. For
example, the response to information campaigns on health consequences of
smoking has taken years to show up in survey data. 32 Similarly, if Americans
are becoming more litigious, we would not expect to see this reflected in
litigation rates for just a few years. On the other hand, observing such rates
over a short period could be sufficient to determine whether increases in
litigation could have contributed to current congestion and delay on a civil
calendar.
VI
WHEN IS IT AN ANECDOTE?
During the recent tort liability debate, much was made of stories about
jury awards to the man who was injured in the refrigerator race, the burglars
who fell through the skylight, and the psychic who lost her special powers. 33
Most listeners also heard the debunking of those stories. 34 By the end of the
debate, everyone, it appears, had learned not to trust anecdotes.
The dictionary defines the term "anecdote" as "usually a short narrative of
an interesting, amusing or biographical incident. " 35 The definition does not
require that the story be true or false. Much of the negative reaction to the
use of anecdotes in the tort liability debate stems from the discovery that the
stories circulated were usually false-or at least not completely true. But this
reaction misses the main point: the problem with substituting anecdotes for
more systematic data is that the story-teller does not (and usually cannot)
provide any information to indicate whether the story is representative.
Whether it was a professional burglar who fell through the skylight or a kid
playing a prank, it is necessary to determine how representative that person's
experience was of the total experiences of individuals who have accidents,
seek tort compensation, and so on. Without such information, the
significance of the story is uncertain.
With the new enthusiasm for rejecting anecdotes has come, unfortunately,
a new negativism about qualitative research. Interview data are discounted as
war stories. Interpretations of case study material are inherently suspect. If
the researcher cannot estimate a regression model, that researcher must not
be dealing with real data. The danger in such thinking lies in the fact that
32. J. WASSERMAN, EXCISE -rAXES, REGULATION AND THE DEMAND FOR CIGARETTES 3 (1989).
33. Church, supra note 7, at 20-21; see also Daniels & Martin, supra note 4, at 325-26.
34. Church, supra note 7, at 20-21.
35. WEBSTERS NEW COLLEGIArE DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1972).
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many of the civil justice phenomena that need study are not suited to current
quantitative analytic techniques.
Researchers simply do not have available very good quantitative
approaches to studying large social organizations or interaction processes.
Often, political scientists and legal sociologists adapt anthropological
techniques to find out how various dispute processing programs work or how
lawyers manage their cases. The standards for such research are not
incorporated in statistics textbooks, but they do derive from the same
methodological paradigms that more quantitative analysts use: observing a
large enough number of courts, lawyers, judges, or disputes; including the
variety that exists among the population; and using techniques that are
systematic enough so that another researcher using the same approach could
expect to uncover the same facts. A researcher needs to provide enough raw
descriptive information to enable a critic to decide whether the story
constructed from these observations is supported by the data, or whether a
contrary story is equally plausible. Accomplishing this task is more of an art
than a science, but it is important for researchers to recognize the continuing
importance of qualitative data in civil justice research. 36
VII
GENERALIZING FROM LIMITED DATA
One of the most difficult issues in designing social research is attempting
to balance internal and external validity. Although this topic receives
extensive consideration in social research methods texts, it is intuitively
obvious that in conducting research one must often choose between knowing
a good deal about a very specific population of people, cases, or courts, with a
high degree of confidence, and knowing less about a broader population, with
a lower degree of confidence. Often, particularly in a topical area for which
there is poorly developed theory and a scanty empirical database, researchers
opt for more careful and more intensive study of the narrowly bounded
population. Sometimes they choose a population that is inherently
interesting to them. For example, the ICJ has studied the Los Angeles
Superior Court, in part because it is the local court and in part because, as the
largest court in the nation, it seems to present particular challenges for court
management. 37 Sometimes researchers choose groups or sites for study
because they believe they will represent a particular class of experiences. In
the ICJ study of asbestos litigation, the researchers chose jurisdictions with
the largest asbestos caseloads in the country in part because they wanted to
explore problems associated with the concentrated distribution of many mass
36. R. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS (1984) (discusses systematic case-
study research methods).
37. See M. SELVIN & P. EBENER, MANAGING THE UNMANAGEABLE: HISTORY OF CIVIL DELAY IN THE
Los ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT (1984).
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exposure cases. 38  Sometimes, of course, researchers simply choose
populations for which data are available.3 9
These kinds of choices truly satisfy only the small group of policymakers
who are specifically concerned with the population under study. Another set
of policymakers may want to extrapolate from such findings to their own
limited populations of interest. They want to know how arbitration works in
their own state, not in California, or how juries respond to cases in Dade
County, Florida, but not in Cook County, Illinois. Not surprisingly, these
policymakers remain skeptical about the usefulness of the available data. A
third set of policymakers wants to derive guidance for broader
decisionmaking. These policymakers want to know what product liability
filing trends in the federal district courts suggest about the impact of product
liability on the economy, or what the experience with asbestos litigation
indicates about the courts' ability to deal with toxic tort cases. They are only
happy with the answers researchers give them until a policymaker on the
opposite side of the issue brings forward her research experts to dispute the
applicability of the limited available data.
Researchers either need to insist that their data pertain only to the specific
population studied-if they believe that is the case-or to assist policymakers
in making sensible inferences from the available data. California arbitration
results may have general implications for other populous, urbanized states
contemplating the same sorts of statutory provisions and rules that govern the
California program. Jury verdict trends in Chicago and San Francisco are
unlikely to be replicated in rural or suburban courts. The fact that two such
different cities produce similar trends, however, coupled with more
fragmentary data on national trends, suggest that the findings may be
representative of trends in metropolitan areas generally. The number of
product liability cases in federal courts, by itself, does not tell much about the
impact of liability on the economy. The fact that one particular court has
difficulty managing its asbestos caseload may tell more about that court than
about toxic tort litigation. The fact that courts generally have difficulty
dealing with statistical evidence linking asbestos exposure to various diseases,
however, suggests strongly that they will have difficulty dealing with such
evidence in other toxic exposure cases.
Perhaps the key factor that distinguishes policy analysts from their more
basic-research-oriented colleagues is their willingness to extrapolate from
limited data to broader policy questions, and their belief that such
extrapolation, properly performed under appropriate circumstances, serves
important policy goals. It has been said that a little knowledge is a dangerous
thing, but for policymaking, small amounts of data-when they have been
38. See D. HENSLER, W. FELSTINER, M. SELVIN & P. EBENER, ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: THE
CHALLENGE OF MASS Toxic TORTS 7 (1985).
39. This was the rationale behind the ICJ's choice of Cook County, Illinois, and San Francisco,
California, for jury verdict analysis. M. PETERSON, supra note 4, at 1.
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collected carefully and analyzed properly-are sometimes better than no data
at all.
VIII
CONCLUSION
Researchers have a responsibility to indicate the sorts of inferences that
can and cannot be drawn from the data they collect and analyze. They also
have a responsibility to educate policymakers about the uses of different
statistical data. They need to be self-conscious about how they describe
magnitude differences, select standards for comparisons, and define time
periods for graphing trends. They should be clear about definitions of what
constitutes data and what should be relegated to the netherworld of
anecdotes. They need to assist policymakers in deciding when it makes sense
to extrapolate from limited data and when it does not. Last, but not least,
they need to be sensitive to the ways in which their own political and social
values affect their choices of research questions, research designs, and
reporting of research data, and they should expect colleagues to point out
instances in which those values have lead them astray. The highly politicized
world of policy research challenges researchers to keep their political
personae separate from their research analytic personae. But it also presents
exciting opportunities to contribute to policymaking on legal issues while
improving basic knowledge about civil justice processes.
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